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Abstract
This article reconsiders the present-day automation of work and its transformation of 
who we are as humans. What has been missing from this important conversation are 
the social meanings surrounding Asian roboticism or how Asians have already been 
rendered as “robotic” subjects and labor. Through this racial gendered trope, I assess 
whether industrial automation will lessen, complicate, or exacerbate this modern 
archetype. By looking at corporate organizational practices and public media dis-
course, I believe that Asian roboticism will not simply vanish, but potentially continue 
to affect the ways such subjects are rendered as exploitable alienated robots without 
human rights or status.
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1 Introduction
At the dawn of a “Asian Century” we are witnessing a reorientation of global 
economic activity from the West towards the East. Yet the “posthuman 
ecologies” created by this process and their effects on the experience and rep-
resentation of Asian people is not clear cut, especially within a postmillennial, 
global setting that operates like an integrated machine in terms of “distributed 
parts and patterns of circulation” (Lee 2014:30). This article seeks to probe 
the issue of robotics in the twenty-first century from the perspective of Asian 
roboticism, which I define as the way robots bear “Asian” characteristics and 
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vice versa. We might ask: how does the new world order alter the ways Asians 
are already seen as a mechanized race by the West? Such correlations draw 
from a “techno-Orientalist” framing of people from the East as passive, stoic 
cogs who merely mimic, copy, and toil relentlessly (Lowe 2014; Rhee 2015). 
From Chinese factory workers to well-choreographed Korean dancers, the 
gendered, racialized idea of Asian roboticism coheres within a global techno-
culture ever more defined by Asian actors and interests.
This article assesses whether the automation of work will complicate or 
exacerbate the Western (mostly US) archetype of Asians as a robot-like popula-
tion within late-capitalist public culture. In doing so, it addresses the following 
questions: what does it mean to be not simply a techno-cultural “other,” but 
hybrid, global machines shaped by different value systems as well as by ste-
reotypes? It also considers how the automation of work is changing our sense 
of who we are as human beings from a global, Asian perspective. What has 
been missing from this important conversation are the social meanings sur-
rounding Asian roboticism, or how Asians have already been already rendered 
as “robotic” subjects and labor. Through this, racial gendered trope, I assess 
whether the automation of work will lessen, complicate, or exacerbate this 
archetype. By looking at corporate organizational practices and public media 
discourse, I argue that Asian roboticism will not simply vanish, but potentially 
continue to affect the ways such subjects are rendered as exploitable, alienated 
robots without human rights or subjectivity.
2 Reconfiguring Asian Roboticism in the Asian Century
By exploring Asians as living automatons, we can make sense of the human 
robot as a moving global signifier that can be appropriated even by Asians. 
This moves beyond the observations by Artur Lozano-Méndez (2010) that 
techno-Orientalist images have been diversifying, and projected to societies 
like Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and China. While he focuses mostly on 
Japan and its development of robotics, he considers how the features of the 
“oriental other” in one country can be adapted in another in order to “epito-
mize a hyper-technified, dehumanized and materialist society” (pg. 183). This 
article adds to the work of Lozano-Méndez, as well as media scholars like Jane 
Park (2010) who is interested in the construction of “technological others” that 
are “racially coded Asian” (pg. 177). The article breaks the broad generalization 
of techno-Orientalism to be more culturally specific (techno-orientalism with 
Chinese characteristics), mapping the rising interdependency of superpowers 
like US and China. But my specific aim in this article seeks to comprehend 
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how Asian roboticism might work as a complicated form of difference-making 
across regional scales—where various technocultural forms and conditions 
play into new social types. This objective pays attention to the subtle codes, 
hidden cues, and pluralistic sensibilities emerging not under one singular Asia, 
but pluralistic “global Asias” (Chen 2017).
Stepping away from the universalizing abstract question of what will hap-
pen to human beings in the age of robots, we can ask what it means to be an 
Asian automaton in the world run by machines, and what does acting “robotic” 
mean in specific contexts? For example, an academic in Singapore criticized 
his country’s narrow focus on grades and how students are pressed into ser-
vice as “learning machines,” drilled in the art of test-taking with the unblinking 
piety of automata: “You’re stifling someone’s ability to think for themselves. 
You’re like robots. You can’t think out of the box” (Vasager 2016). I argue that 
the conflation of Asians with robotic qualities—in personhood and in work 
style—persists, and this mythic quality affects the ways subjects throughout 
Asia are objectified as idealized machines.
In the US, East Asians have been traditionally viewed as posthuman, robot-
like, mechanized beings. This American invention remains a main point of 
departure for scholars who work in the growing field of techno-Orientalism 
(Roh et al. 2015). Besides US techno-Orientalism, we can think more broadly 
about technoculture beyond the strict definition presented by Constance 
Penley and Andrew Ross who defined it as “what could be called actually 
existing technoculture in Western society, where the new cultural technolo-
gies have penetrated deepest, and where the environments they have created 
seem almost second nature to us” (Penley and Ross 1991:xii). In a time when the 
Western “us” has been deeply penetrated by Asian technocultural influences 
and products, we might focus on the myriad way cultural practices enabled by 
technology are not just Western or Eastern, but global in the sense that actors 
are simultaneously and collectively refashioning the Asian robot figure.
The human-automaton relation is complicated in Japan, which is global 
in its technocultural impact on the world, and also parochial due to internal 
social organization. Christopher Simons (2017), a North American professor 
based in Tokyo, argues that though we associate Japan as a leader in robots, 
the country lags in integrating robots into society due to a punishing corpo-
rate work culture and a population with “an intense work ethic that already 
ensures a supply of robotic labour—in human form.” Japan, he says, builds the 
future but lives in the past due to its problematic issues with sexuality, strong 
economic protectionism, and lack of individuality. “Japanese society is already 
‘robotic’ in ways that other countries are not … The highly structured nature 
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of Japanese society will make people-facing AIs easier to introduce but may 
have little impact on improving the lives of the once-ubiquitous ‘salaryman’” 
(Ibid). While trying on a telepresence robot body, Simons finds the metallic 
constraints of new technologies “remarkably similar to the social constraints 
of living in Japan, where the smooth-running social machine depends on a 
communal willingness to be a little artificial ourselves” (Ibid).
Despite the feeling of unicity that comes with more people traveling around 
the world, certain scripts endure. For example, the gaze of a travel blogger found 
Taiwanese people to be “empty shells with no soul or emotions, like plastic 
mannequins (similar to America, but even worse). Their faces are passionless 
and robotic, as if their soul and humanity has been squashed, suppressed, or 
drained out of them” (Happier Abroad 2013). Such instances of technocultural 
othering makes Taiwanese people into the worst kind of robots we do not want 
to become, despite the fact that Americans are already themselves turning into 
plastic automatons. This example follows Daniel Vukovich’s (2013) observation 
that global Orientalism has shifted from one based on a logic of cultural essen-
tialism; to one of general equivalency reflecting the postmodern logic of global 
capitalism which forces recognition of Asian modernity, even if there are still 
feelings of European superiority to Asians.
Characterizations of Asians as perfect machines does not need to work at the 
level of verbal insult, as the market economy already makes global machines 
out of alienated labor. In 2017, the Indian government extended a ban on com-
mercial surrogacy, reserving it only for needy Indian couples, halting a lucrative 
business built on abuse of the poor (Sachdev 2018). As commercial medical 
tourism ran rampant since its legalization in India in 2002, low-income women 
were recruited as surrogates churning out babies for rich couples based in 
Western nations. Due to colonial metaphors of the brown female body as an 
overly fertile machine, there arose a “rent-a-womb” market, where surrogates 
are deemed a “non-inventive” object of science, a reproductive technology 
with detachable organs, artificial uteruses, and other detachable parts within 
a “mechanical imagination of the body” (Atanasoski and Vora 2015:19). India’s 
policy was followed by bans in Nepal and Thailand, pushing the industry into 
Laos and Cambodia, where surrogacy brokers work with their international cli-
entele to transform local women into “baby-making machines” (Wilson 2013). 
Meanwhile, the outsourcing of tech-support computer work in Hyderabad, 
Bangalore, and Mumbai focalizes the lifestyle of “Indian machines” huddled 
in back offices like cattle as part of “India’s outsourcing industry [that] thrums 
with potential and power, as if it were a itself a machine.”
114 Bui
Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 19 (2020) 110-126
3 China’s Ascent as the Rise of the Machines
During the US-led “War on Terror,” the specter of global machines was found 
in the remake of the Cold War classic, the Manchurian Candidate (2004). This 
release, which occurred right after the US invasion of Iraq, demonstrates the 
fear of sedition and mind-control over American politicians by an unknown, 
Orientalized enemy state, possibly from China, the Arab world, and/or North 
Koreans. For the US and West, it is primarily China with its billion-plus popu-
lation under communist rule that appears as the most extreme antipode to 
the “American way of life.” US news media often depict developing nations 
like China as “being populated by extraordinarily zealous and hard-working 
populations, as much machines as human beings, underselling and out-
performing” (Birch et al. 2001:1). As the editors of Techno-Orientalism write, 
“Glossy spreads of endless rows of Chinese workers in corporate factories and 
towns in mainstream magazines such as Time and Wired seal the visual vocab-
ulary of Asians as the cogs of hyperproduction. Techno-Orientalist discourse 
constructs Asians as mere simulacra and maintains a prevailing sense of the 
inhumanity of Asian labor—the very antithesis of Western liberal humanism” 
(Roh et al. 2015:5). They mention manufacturers in China replacing US tech 
companies through their ingenuity, leading a global technological revolution, 
building the world’s fastest supercomputer and railway, graduating the most 
college students and engineers, all the while producing the most scientific 
patents in the world. Here the rise of China can be reposed as the rise of the 
machines. As Betsy Huang (2008) observes, the perception of Chinese soci-
ety as machinic serves a dubious purpose in terms of narrating ambivalence 
toward Asian progress:
To both contain the ‘horde’ and to make use of it for its own economic 
interests, the West constructs Chinese as instruments for national and 
global (i.e. Western) progress—a construction that renders them at 
once exploitable, containable, and inhuman. Today, the robot has been 
recoded as Chinese; striking photographs of rows and rows of uniformed 
Chinese factory workers that depict them as mechanized cogs in a mass 
production machine have been burnished into the Western public con-
sciousness. These images of a technologized Chinese workforce are the 
latest iteration of the West’s enduring ambivalence toward ‘Orientals’ as 
both necessary instruments for and impediments to progress. (pg. 26)
China’s stimulus to the global economy demands attention to the value of 
Chinese mechanical labor. Racial distinctions between (mechanical) copying 
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and (human) creativity can be traced to the early twentieth century, when anti-
Chinese racism got deployed in trade recipes in chemical and manufacturing 
production. The impact of Chinese “copiers” resulted in the solidification of 
trademark rights and an intellectual property regime poised against the fraud-
ulent “foreign” adaptation of universal “common knowledge” (Lean 2018). The 
Chinese copycat that only makes foreign knockoffs ties into the broader con-
temporary “factory imaginary” of China that sets up a novelty vs. repetition 
divide, slotting different kinds of work and people within the global technocul-
tural imaginary. As Roh et al. (2015) write, “Little work is required to translate 
Orientalist tropes: the invading horde of barbarians is replaced by a horde of 
robotic factory workers, kept at a distance by multinational corporations and 
shipping routes. They are uncreative, less than human, and always already 
mechanized” (pg. 226).
Chinese factory workers, however, must deal with the leitmotif of Asian 
roboticism and over-mechanization in very personal terms. As China grew into 
the global source of labor for manufacturing, reports about Chinese female 
workers treated as automata made a splash (China Times 2012). In 2018, a 
Chinese factory in Chongqing was under investigation by a Hong Kong NGO 
for treating students “like robots” to complete production of Apple Watches, 
students who were there not as voluntary workers, but unpaid “interns” learn-
ing for their vocational degrees. One student describes the experience in this 
manner: “We are like robots on the production lines … We repeat the same pro-
cedure for hundreds and thousands of times every day, like a robot” (Hellard 
2010). In 2012, US tech giant Apple found itself under fire for its associations 
with Foxconn (the world’s largest electronics manufacturer), a Taiwanese sub-
contractor working in southern China that produces Apple products for the US 
and world market. Under pressure to churn out iPads, workers were deprived of 
rest days and a report found women were treated “inhumanely, like machines” 
(Chamberlain 2011; Wee 2012). Endless toil created a spate of suicides, which 
were often unpremeditated, like one woman who jumped off her fourth floor 
of her dormitory when her mind just went blank. She became paralyzed and 
was confined to a wheelchair (Chan 2013). When the supervisor was asked 
about the spate of suicides, warranting netting beneath workers’ dormitory 
windows, he said blithely, “Suicides were not connected to bad working condi-
tions. There was a copy effect. If one commits suicide, then others will follow” 
(Ibid). This callous statement puts workers in the category of stupid automa-
tons unconscientiously following one another toward self-destruction, putting 
blame on them rather than the harsh working conditions and violence of orga-
nizational practices where overtime proved to be overkill. To such a charge, 
Zhang Shuxiang, an employee in one of those factories responds, “We’re not 
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machines,” verbalizing a dissent against her designation as posthuman being 
without a soul or feelings. Other workers concur by discussing the company’s 
brutal practices like a no talking policy, “What is wrong with talking with oth-
ers. It helps me relieve stress. Foxconn is treating us like robots” (Wong 2010). 
Labor activists protested outside the company headquarters in Taipei urging 
executives to “respect life and to stop its inhuman and militarized treatment 
of workers aimed at maximizing profits … [the workers] are treated almost like 
machines” (China Labor Watch 2010). As one worker recounts about her auto-
mated experience as a “spare part” within the machinery of the factory, “I am 
the quality evaluator. I am placed in the iron chair, tied by static lines. When the 
reflow delivers me the cell phone motherboards, repeatedly, I take it with two 
hands, and then shaking my head from right to left, moving my eye from left to 
right, up and down. It never ends. If I found it is deficient or anything wrong 
with … another spare part of the machine like me will immediately run to me 
and ask about the reason and then regulate the line” (Lucas et al. 2013:98).
The fact that it was a US multinational company like Apple operating in con-
junction with Asian subcontractors reveals how human/labor/women’s rights 
are assiduously rent asunder by a tech industry that treat workers as automata, 
and where there is no singular source of responsibility within a global network 
of actors. Indeed, the world’s most popular smartphone, the iPhone, is made 
from processing rare earth elements in Mongolia, camera lenses in Japan, and 
batteries and microprocessors in South Korea.1 China is the final assembly site 
for the global factory. The transformation of workers into global machines con-
tinues despite a recent report found that Foxconn plans to replace all its workers 
with robots in order to “relieve itself of any issues stemming from its treatment 
of workers without having to actually improve living and working conditions 
or increase wages … putting hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people 
out of work” (Statt 2016). Full automation will shift the exploitation to work-
ers in Southeast Asia, which does not have the same technological capacities 
or economies of scale as China. As Apple’s biggest supplier, Foxconn has been 
moving towards greater automation, but those remaining factory workers once 
treated as machines are now stuck in dead-end jobs, and learning that they are 
mere attendants to the incoming Foxbots (humanized by being called “harmo-
nious men”) expected to replace eighty percent of workers (Chan 2017). Not 
afforded any dignity, workers are “positioned as machines, but also as cheaper 
1   Aside from producing technological products for the world, China is also a repository for tak-
ing in disposed machines, since 70 percent of the world’s electronic waste is sent here to be 
disassembled and stripped for their parts for precious metals, a practice that poses biological 
hazard to the miner.
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(read: less valuable) than machines” (Lucas et al. 2013:98) Says one worker, “In 
the production process, workers occupy the lowest position, even below the 
lifeless machinery. Workers come second to, and worn out by, the machines. 
But I am not a machine” (Ngai and Chan 2012:392). In this statement, industrial 
robots appear more privileged than humans.
Despite the cosmopolitan belief in a coming “global village,” there is still a 
pervasive sense that certain people are not fully part of the public commons 
of humanity. In 2008, the year China hosted the Olympics, a British reporter 
attacked the “robotic” Chinese Olympic security team who were imported as 
torch minders, describing them like a good squad who barked orders at her 
on the street as protestors demonstrated against China’s human rights abuses 
(Dailymail 2008). During news media coverage of 2012, Olympic Games in 
London, British diver Tom Daley said of Chinese rival Qui Bo that he is kind of 
“robot or he has been known to be like a robot.” And media reporters observed 
Qui bearing a steely, unexpressive face even after winning consecutive gold 
medals and beating Daley with perfect scores (Associated Press 2012). For 
Daley, China’s super-athlete won because he was trained by the party-state 
in its “Olympian Factories,” forced to perform “as flawlessly as a robot on the 
conveyor belt from the medal machine” (Frayer 2016). When 16-year-old swim-
mer Ye Shiwen broke world records for 400 individual medley, she was called a 
robot by her competitors, a claim to which she responded at a news conference, 
“I am not a robot. I am a lucky girl. I don’t need to practice over and over every 
day.” The Chinese Daily responded with the official line: “Robots? Nope—Just 
Really Good Athletes” (Xiaochen 2012). Although it cautioned against accept-
ing the theory of Chinese as stupid cogs of the state, the Italian publication La 
Republica nevertheless put out an article with the suggestive title, “Operation 
Yao Ming, Created in a Lab.” Inferring that the most famous Chinese basket-
ball player in the world is the “product of scientific breeding techniques” by 
a militaristic authoritarian country used to pumping out “mechanical robots, 
tall, cold and lifeless, adored as demi-gods” (Tarantino and Carini 2013:324). 
Even before China came to global prominence claims of child abuse and drug 
doping at the Olympic Games in Atlanta fed into “the stereotype of the Big Red 
Machine that turns out robotic athletes for the state” (Brownell 1997:21-22). If 
the Olympics celebrates the greatest achievement of human ability and the 
world’s ability to come together in the name of competitive sports, accusations 
of the PRC as operating an assembly line of robotic athletics deracinates that 
transcendent humanistic ethos and spirit.
What happens then when Asians replicate and reproduce this sense of 
Asian roboticism? China is at the forefront of global, AI synthesis, produc-
ing human-looking androids like a male-appearing, robot, television anchor 
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for the Xinhua news agency. Such AI anchors can work 24 hours a day and 
receive input from texts in the system (Tao 2018). They do everything from tak-
ing orders at a restaurant to policing malls as security. Robots in the public 
media however appear often in a youthful female form to work for and enter-
tain humans. Publicized with news article titles like “Bionic Woman: Chinese 
Humanoid Robot Turns on the Charm in Shanghai,” these robotic women are 
controlled by cloud technology, and assumed to bear the right “soft” personal-
ity for subservience (The Hindu 2017). Jia Jia, first trotted out in 2017 by a team 
of engineers at the University of Science and Technology of China, was con-
ceived to perform a range of menial tasks like cleaning restaurants, vacuuming 
nursing homes, and washing patients in hospitals. Her creators contend she 
heralds a new generation of cyborg labor, perhaps freeing up grunt work so 
that Chinese workers do not have to do such drudgery themselves.
4 The Robotization of Global Workers
Understanding the social aspects of automation is indispensable as robots are 
changing every facet of the planet in what can be called the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution (Schwab 2017). At a superficial level we understand that techno-
logical advances like roboticization are threatening to upend human labor, 
swelling the problem of precarious employment across the planet to the extent 
so called “sewbots” possess the capacity to work faster than low-wage factory 
workers. From driving cars to cleaning floors, these robots accompanied by 
drones and computers are modifying the technology-society interface, and 
concomitantly intensifying income gaps and stagnation of wages. All of this 
has created a panic-stricken feeling around the threat of “globots,” while incit-
ing a backlash against migrants, refugees, and Asian economies, all blamed for 
the West’s decline and a stunning loss of blue-collar jobs (Baldwin 2019).
Absent from all the hype about global automation is a deeper discussion 
of who will be most impacted by such developments. As Louis Hyman (2018) 
writes, most companies in the electronics industry rarely employed robots, 
and this still seems to be case despite prognostications of a robot revolution. 
“Every time someone says ‘robot,’ simply picture a woman of color. Instead 
of self-aware robots, workers—all women, mostly immigrants, sometimes 
undocumented—hunched over tables with magnifying glasses assembling 
parts, sometimes on a factory line and sometimes on a kitchen table.” Jill 
Lepore (2019) finds that in terms of the human-machine analogy “something 
darker is going on, mirrored in the feminizing of robots … female workers 
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aren’t being paid more for being human; instead, robots are selling better when 
they’re female.”
Many Internet companies rely on an invisible labor pool of overseas work-
ers to “soak up the worst of humanity in order to protect the rest of us,” says 
Hemanshu Nigam, chief security officer for the popular American website, 
Myspace (Drum 2014). Nigam estimates that there might be over 100,000 “con-
tent moderators” who are responsible for data scrubbing, making clean all the 
offensive material on the Internet, and social media sites such as Facebook, 
Instagram, YouTube, Google, and Twitter. These hidden moderators based 
in Manila are double the head count of Google employees, and 14 times the 
number of Facebook’s US-based workers. Yet they are not considered full-
time employees of the multinational tech companies, receiving almost no 
pension benefits and recognition as “real” workers (Chen 2014). Most of this 
digital labor is done in the Philippines since robot moderators or AI are not 
yet smart enough to grasp social context or moral gray areas. These workers 
have opened up about the trauma of spending hours on end pressing the 
button “ignore” or “delete,” perusing through the worst acts against human-
ity so those living in the rest of the world can have a sanitized experience of 
global interconnectivity (Lekach 2008). In many ways, these global workers are 
made to feel like unfeeling robots paid to suppress any human emotions. In 
short, these invisible machines of the Global South are relied upon to absorb 
human pain, so the rest of us can enjoy unperturbed privileged digitized lives 
in the global village. This resonates with the perception of Asians as dull, list-
less robots in the field of domestic care and affective labor. In Israel, migrant 
workers from the Philippines were called “foreign robots” by those complain-
ing against the importation of “vacant eyed” and “lifeless” workers acting like 
“automatons” while going through the mind-numbing protocols of caregiving 
(Bradley 2014:102).2
In a globally integrated economy, it is vital to assess how rich nations like 
South Korea utilize outsourced workers in the Philippines to envision a roboti-
cized, Asian future. Korea has been testing teaching machines in classrooms 
due to a lack of fluent English-language instructors, employing hundreds 
of robots as classroom playmates and teachers. With female workers in the 
Philippines “telepresent in the machines,” the robots are fitted with cameras 
2   This happened during a lecture series aimed at older “Anglo” (English speaking) Israelis. 
A social worker explained the geriatric services offered in Israel and methods for individu-
als to effectively engage with long-term planning, including the process for hiring a migrant 
caregiver.
120 Bui
Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 19 (2020) 110-126
that record the foreign teacher’s face imprinted on a celluloid screen, which 
displays the robot teacher’s animated CG face (if not live video the default 
image is a white woman). They can also interact with Korean students through 
a two-way video camera installed in a robot that can be commanded to move, 
sing, and dance with undulating robotic arms. These robots are part of a 
national project in South Korea to automate teaching, tapping into a global 
language-learning market dominated by English, something that draws on 
the English proficiency found in the Philippines, a former US colony (his-
torical traces and whiteness thus inform the pathway of our cyborg futures). 
Mastering a “Filipina-tinged” American accent, the human/sender mediate 
global forms of education and childcare, according to Anna Guevarra (2018), 
that play into racialized, gendered hierarchies of skill even as it confounds 
the relationship between human and automaton. As Guevarra makes clear, the 
erasure of the “real” teacher’s physical presence leads them to feel they are 
actually robots and identify with the robots, even while they “must balance a 
fine line between being humanlike yet still appearing to be a thing, an enter-
taining gadget” (pg. 757). As one teacher who considers herself the world’s first 
“robot teacher” explains: “Engkey is a robot that has a human face and the body 
of a machine … I felt like I was more like Engkey. I know that it was not my face 
they were seeing. It was an avatar. They only heard my voice” (Ibid:754).
Such disembodied, interactive exchange through the telecom bears some 
similarity to the workers employed through Amazon. The world’s largest 
online retailer was accused of treating its employees within its well-packed 
warehouse like robots (Rittenhouse 2017). As one employee observes, “I was 
working as an order picker, and you’re already treated as a robot … You’re 
clocking up idle time, you’re taking time to get to the toilet. They started treat-
ing human beings as robots, essentially. If it proves cheaper to replace humans 
with machines, I assume they will do that. I couldn’t see them being con-
cerned with people losing their jobs” (Picchi 2018). Responding to pressures 
for humane labor practices and better compensation Amazon started a new 
business model called the Mechanical Turk. It uses non-office workers from 
all over the World Wide Web to fulfill on-demand temporary assignments and 
crowdsourcing tasks that computers cannot accurately perform, such as visu-
ally identifying objects in a photo or transcribing audio recordings. Without 
retirement, overtime pay, or health benefits, the independent contractors do 
not get the same treatment as salaried employees on payroll (Wilson 2013). 
When the BBC (2013) sent an undercover reporter to an Amazon warehouse 
the journalist wrote how he and other “pickers” that collected inventory items 
“are machines, we are robots … we don’t think for ourselves, maybe they don’t 
trust us to think for ourselves as human beings, I don’t know.”
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A third of Amazon’s MTurk workers hail from India, who use it as their main 
source of income. Amazon pays them in rupees, an hourly wage of 30 cents. 
The rest of the employees come from miscellaneous countries, expressing 
the interwoven nature of the global homework or the gig economy. The name 
of Amazon’s program honors an old trick of a mechanical puppet garbed in 
Turkish attire that played and won games of chess with human players in late-
eighteenth century Europe, even though there was an actual person behind the 
Turk.3 It was named so because populations east of Europe were understood 
to be “docile” and “soulless” automatons (Aytes 2012). The Mechanical Turk’s 
name reveals hidden power relations as its name gives reference to the parlor 
trick of “concealing small human beings who actually did the work purport-
edly done by machines” (Golumbia 2015). The ghost of the original mechanical 
Turk haunts today’s workers who are reduced to a small stature as casualized 
and captive laborers. All of this is, according to Miranda Hall (2017),
part of a craze for automata designed to resemble the oriental ‘Other’ … 
but the Muslim-as-machine takes on new meanings as workers in impov-
erished areas, from Syrian refugee camps to the Palestinian occupied 
territories, are forced to perform these repetitive, unskilled tasks, con-
cealed behind a slick, anonymized interface. Machine-like, always-on, 
this ‘surplus population’ can always be tapped into by companies to fuel 
the twenty-four-hour business cycle that drives Western progress.
These states of human exception will not disappear anytime soon as the 
Amazonization of things coincides with the datafication of people.
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers exist almost in synergetic fashion to 
smart-home, robotic assistants, forming a “surrogate humanity” found in the 
novel frontiers between human and machine” (Atanasoski and Vora 2015). 
In the light of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the production of intelligent 
machines performing the labor performed traditionally by devalued racial/
gender classes, we can discern a new sliding scale of humanity within a period 
of innovation that has witnessed a range of emergent new technologies like 
nanotechnology, unmanned aerial attack drones, 3-D printers, and artificial 
hearts and organs. In this brave new world people are not mere substitutes 
for technology or technology themselves. Here a new cognitive map is drawn 
3   The naming of the program is inspired by the Turk, a chess-playing Orientalized automaton 
invented in 1770 that successfully played against smart humans like Benjamin Franklin for 
close to a century. The Turk turned out to be an elaborate hoax as there was a chess master 
pulling strings to operate the machine.
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“out of which emerges the ‘smart infrastructure’ of the human-thing network” 
(Ibid). Asian robots exist as an object of difference within global technoculture 
in a world where “nonwhite work may be performed interchangeably under 
the sign of automaton, either by dark-skinned servants to technology, or, sub-
sequently, by fleshless technological servants” (Kevorkian 2006:88).
5 Conclusion
The technocultural myth that fully sentient robots will someday be our over-
lords or slaves fails to recognize the historical forms of Asian robot formation. 
Machineness is becoming more “Asianized” and global at the same time. This 
has implications for understanding the global popular culture and technocul-
ture. The global rise of machines forecasts a historic shift in the balance for 
mankind that parallels machine-like Asian societies coming to power by dis-
empowering Asian workers.
The ideation of Asians as robotic subjects/objects evolves in order to reflect 
the reconfiguration of marginalized and mechanized populations. Asian 
roboticism tells us of the making of technocultural subjects and objects within 
public phenomena, challenging scholars across the humanities and social 
sciences to think about how power/difference manifests in localized events 
around the world. Such an interdisciplinary project contributes to organi-
zational studies, sociology of race/gender, cultural anthropology, and global 
political economy. The question of who can be human and who are posthu-
man robots is evolving in an era of global machines, when novel technologies 
and capitalist processes muddle the line between East and West, the self and 
the other, man and machine. Ensconced within Asian roboticism are ways in 
which human machines are exploited, and demonstrates against the belief 
that the rise of robots will end contending issues of race, gender, class, and 
sexuality.
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